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ABTRACT
This study aims to examine the ability of the Beneish M-Score model 
to detect fraudulent financial reporting. The Data research sample 
consisted of 55 manipulator companies that were sanctioned and 
fined by the Financial Services Authority due to violating POJK 
number X.K.1; X.K.4; IX.E.1; IX.E.2 and VIII.G.7 during 2012-
2016 and 55 non-manipulator companies as comparison companies. 
The results showed that 28 of the 55 manipulator companies were 
correctly classified as fraud firms by 50.91%, while for the category 
of non-manipulator companies, there were as many as 60% or 33 of 
the 55 companies correctly classified as non-fraud firms.The results 
also identified three M-Score variables that were often manipulated 
by manipulator and non-manipulator companies namely Sales and 
General and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI), Depreciation 
Index (DEPI) and Asset Quality Index (AQI), but two other variables 
namely Days Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI) and Sales Growth 
Index (SGI) are considered unable to detect fraudulent financial 
reporting. In addition, based on the results of the logistic regression 
test, the eight Beneish M-Score variables have no effect on the detection 
of fraudulent financial reporting.The Beneish M-Score model is an 
easy and cheap way to detect possible fraudulent financial reporting, 
this can be applied by investors before determining their investment 
decisions.
Keyword: Fraudulent financial reporting; Beneish M-Score; Logistic 
Regression;
1. INTRODUCTION
According to Tuanakotta (2010), 
presentation errors in financial statements 
can arwase due to fraud and errors. 
Generally detecting errors was much 
easier than fraud because errors were 
commonly detected by the internal control 
system, whereas fraud perpetrators tried 
to hide their actions. The axiom introduced 
by ACFE Global was that fraud was 
always hidden. The Indonesia Institute of 
Public Account (2015) stated that financial 
reporting containing fraud includes 
intentional misstatements and includes 
the removal of an amount or disclosure 
in financial statements to influence the 
perceptions of users of financial statements. 
Meanwhile, Beneish and Nichols (2007) 
in fraudulent financial reporting gave a 
big loss, but often investors did not use 
relevant information to detect fraud.
The survey conducted by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) globally in 2016 in “Report to 
the Nations on Occupational Fraud and 
Abuse” stated that the overall total losses 
was caused by fraud cases reached $ 6.3 
billion with an average loss per case up to 
$ 2.7 million. ACFE (2016: 12) reported that 
among these fraud cases, the most common 
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types of fraud were Asset Misappropriation 
(83.5%), Corruption (35.4%) and fraudulent 
financial reporting (9.6%) The number 
of fraudulent financial reporting cases in 
2010 to 2016 only reached less than 10% of 
the total. Vice resa, the value of the losses 
caused was very material and pervasive 
at a median rate of $ 975,000 (ACFE, 
2016: 12). Asset Misappropriation had 
the largest percentage of 83.5%, thiswas 
because its nature was easily traceableand 
the losses incurred were not material. 
In 2016, ACFE Indonesia collaborated 
with the White Collar Crime Prevention 
and Research Center (P3K2P) from STIE 
Perbanas Surabaya to conduct research 
on the description of fraud that occurred 
in Indonesia. The results of the Indonesian 
Fraud Survey stated that 154 respondents 
(67%) chose corruption, 71 respondents 
(31%) chose asset misappropriation, and 
the remaining 4 respondents (2%) choose 
fraudulent financial reporting as the most 
detrimental type of fraud in Indonesia. 
Corruption was the most common type 
of fraud in Indonesia and caused the 
greatest losses with an average loss of Rp. 
100 million to Rp.500 million rupiah per 
case, thiswas different from the survey 
conducted by ACFE (2016) which stated 
that fraudulent financial reporting was 
the most detrimental. This difference 
was suspected that in Indonesia a variety 
of financial report crimes had not been 
revealed. Like the crime of information 
fraud on the stock exchange, and crime 
due to tax information fraud.
Many models of fraudulent financial 
reporting had been created today, one of 
which was the Beneish M-Score model 
found by Professor Messod D. Beneish 
in 1999. This model was a quantitative 
approach to investigative auditing and 
forensic accounting that can detect the 
possibility of companies doing fraudulent 
financial reporting and can classify these 
companies as fraud firms and non-fraud 
firms Beneishet al., (2012). This model 
received special attention from the 
public, after the disclosure of the Enron 
accounting scandal. This model was able 
to warn long before the Enron accounting 
disaster was revealed to the public at large. 
The results ofBeneish M-Score model can 
detect companies that commit fraud by 
76% (Messod D. Beneish, 1999). Then they 
conducted a study with a sample of fraud 
companies during the period 1998 - 2002 
(including large cases such as Cendant, 
Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest), the results 
of the study stated that M-Score was able 
to correctly identify 12 of 17 cases or 71% 
(Beneish et al., 2012).This research was 
expected to contribute to the development 
of audit science, especially related to the 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting 
in public companies in Indonesia. 
After that, it provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the concepts of the 
Beneish M-Score model and the eight 
Beneish M-Score variables.
2. THEORICAL BASIS
Literature Review
Fraud
Based on Tuanakotta (2013), fraud was 
an unlawful act that contains elements 
of intentions, bad intentions, deception, 
concealment, and violation of trust 
with the aim of illegal advantages that 
can be in the form of money, goods/
property, services, or business (“winning” 
procurement tenders goods/services by 
bribing officials). Erickson et al., (2004) 
explained that fraudulent financial 
reporting and earnings management have 
the same objective because they both 
manipulate financial statements. But what 
makes it different was that fraudulent 
financial reporting was outside the scope 
of general accepted accounting principle 
(GAAP) while earnings management was 
still within the scope of GAAP.
The Fraud Triangle Theory
Cressey (1953) examined employees who 
stole corporate money (embezzlers). He 
interviewed 200 people who were jailed 
for the fraud. Cressey was interested 
in embezzlers which he calls “trust 
violators”.He argued that people who 
are believed to be violators of trust when 
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they see themselves as people who have 
financial problems that they cannot tell 
others, are aware that this problem can be 
resolved secretly by misusing authority as 
a financial holder, and acting - the daily 
horn allows to adjust the view of him as 
a person who can be trusted in using the 
funds or wealth entrusted (Cressey (1953) 
in Tuanakotta, (2013)).
Figure 1
Fraud Triangle
Source : Donald R. Cressey (1953) within-
Tuanakotta (2013)
Beneish M-Score
This Beneish M-Score model was 
developed using the forensic accounting 
approach. The Beneish M-Score model was 
a probabilistic model, so one limitation 
was that the ability to detect fraud was 
not 100% accurate (Tarjo&Herawati, 
2015). Meanwhile Beneish et al., (2012) 
there were two types of errors related to 
the Beneish M-Score model, namely Type 
I classification errors (the probability of 
not detecting “fraud” in the manipulator 
company) and Type II missclassification 
(probability of detection of “fraud” in non-
manipulator companies).
Beneish et al. (2012) categorized three 
categories related to the eight M-Score 
variables, where (1) very fast or extreme 
growth(SGI), (2) experience economic 
crises/shocks (AQI; GMI; SGAI; and 
LEVI), (3) used of aggressive accounting 
(DSRI; DEPI; and TATA). Besides that, it’s 
basically a SGI; AQI; GMI; SGAI; and LEVI 
was designed to detect the tendency of 
companies to commit fraud, while DSRI; 
DEPI; and TATA had a close relationship 
with accruals and influences accounting 
aggressiveness.
A. Days Sales in Receivables Index 
(DSRI)
DSRI was the ratio of receivables to 
sales in the year of observation (t) to 
the previous year (t-1). A large increase 
in the days’ ratio in sales in receivables 
can be the result of changes in credit 
policies to increase sales in the face 
of business competition. However, the 
disproportionate increase in accounts 
receivable to sales can relatively in-
dicate a surge in income. Therefore, a 
large increase in days’ sales in receiv-
ables has a relationship with the possi-
bility of recording income and profits 
that are too high.
B. Gross Margin Index(GMI)
GMI is the ratio of gross profit in the 
previous year (t-1) to gross profit in the 
year of observation (t). When the GMI 
value is greater than 1, this indicates 
that the company’s gross profit dete-
riorates. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) in 
Beneish (1999) stated that deteriorat-
ing gross profit shows a negative sig-
nal about the company’s prospects. If 
the company with a bad prospect was 
likely to do earnings manipulation. Be-
neish expected a positive relationship 
between GMI and the probability of 
earnings manipulation.
C. Asset Quality Index (AQI)
The quality of assets in certain years 
was a ratio of non-current assets (other 
than Buildings, Land and Equipment) 
to total assets in the year of observation 
(t) to the previous year (t-1). Increasing 
the risk of asset realization will show 
an increase in the company’s involve-
ment in asset capitalization and cost 
delays. If the AQI value was greater 
than 1, this indicates that the company 
has an increased potential of involve-
ment in the company’s cost delays. It 
was expected that there was a positive 
relationship between AQI and the prob-
ability of earnings manipulation.
D. Sales Growth Index (SGI)
SGI was the ratio of sales in the year of 
observation (t) to sales in the previous 
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year (t-1). Sales growth does not mean 
manipulation, but the growth of the 
company was seen by experts as having 
the possibility to commit fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting, because the financial 
position and needs of the company’s 
capital provide a pressure for manage-
ment to achieve profit. If companies 
experience large stock losses, they may 
have greater incentives to manipulate 
profits. For this effect, Fridson (1993: 
7-8) states that companies often try to 
eliminate the impression that their com-
pany’s growth was slowing down, be-
cause that perception can cause losses. 
Thus it was expected that there was a 
positive relationship between SGI and 
the probability of earnings manipula-
tion.
E. Depreciation Index (DEPI)
DEPI was the ratio of the previous 
year’s depreciation rate (t-1) to the rate 
of shrinkage in the observation year (t). 
The DEPI with a value greater than 1 
indicates that the rate at which assets 
are depreciated more slowly increases 
the likelihood that the company has 
changed the estimated useful life of 
the asset or adopted a new method that 
can increase profits. Therefore, it was 
expected that there was a positive rela-
tionship between DEPI and probability 
of manipulation.
F. Sales and General and Admin-
wastrative Expenses Index (SGAI)
SGAI calculates sales expenses and 
administrative expenses on sales in the 
year of observation (t) compared to the 
previous year (t-1). This variable was 
derived from the results of research 
Lev and Thiangarajan (1993) which 
states that analysts will interpret a 
disproportionate increase in a sale, 
indicating a negative signal for the 
company’s prospects in the future. It 
was expected that a positive relationship 
between SGAI and the probability of 
earnings manipulation.
G. Leverage Index (LEVI)
LEVI was the ratio of total debt to total 
assets in the year of observation (t) to the 
previous year (t-1). The value of LEVI 
greater than 1 indicates an increase in 
debt. This variable was included in 
identifying earnings manipulations 
caused by debt contract incentives. The 
LEVI variable specifically measures 
the level of errors in company debt 
estimates, assuming that debt takes 
place randomly.
H. Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA)
TATA variable was calculated by in-
come before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flows against total as-
sets. Total accruals that have been used 
by previous researchers aim to measure 
the extent to which management makes 
procedures for selecting accounting to 
change profits (Jones, 1991). Beneish 
uses total accruals of total assets as a 
proxy to measure how much cash was 
a baswas for reporting company prof-
its and expects a high positive accrual 
(accruals are lower than cash), which 
can be related to the high likelihood the 
company has manipulated earnings.
Previous Research
Tarjo&Herawati (2015) used a sample of 
35 fraud firms and 35 non-fraud companies 
with criteria based on comparable asset 
categories and in the same industry. The 
ability of Beneish M-Score to detect fraud 
was 77.1% (27 of 35 samples of accurate 
fraud companies are classified as fraud). 
Then, out of 35 non-fraud companies, 28 
(80%) accurately did not commit fraud.
Other study, Ramírez-Orellana et al. 
(2017) used a sample of fraud companies 
(Pescanova) during the period 2008-2011 
and used control companies (comparison), 
namely Austevoll, Marine Harvest, and 
Bolton Alimentari who were competitors, 
with criteria having size, liquidity, and 
profitability was proportional to the 
sample of fraud firms. Based on the Beneish 
M-Score calculation, it was known that 
the DSRI, LEVI, SGI, and TATA variables 
had been manipulated by Pescanova, 
besides that the company was proven to 
Asia Pacific Fraud Journal, 4(1) January-June 2019: 27-42 | 31
manipulate financial statements before the 
period of financial difficulties.
Hasan et al. (2017) calculated the 
Overall Manipulation Index (OMI) in each 
country in the Asian Continent based on 
the frequency value of the Beneish M-Score 
variable, then a rating will be made. On 
the basis of the results of the M-Score 
calculation, the order of ranks (from the 
highest to the lowest) was manipulated 
in financial statements in the sample 
countries namely China, Indonesia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Japan. In addition, it was also known that 
the overall value of OMI in 2010-2013 in 
China and Singapore was (0.82), Hong 
Kong (0.76), Thailand (0.75), Indonesia 
(0.72), Malaysia (0,66), and Japan (0.50). 
Next, Kamal et al. (2016) used a sample of 
17 fraudulent companies that are subject 
to legal sanctions as a result of violating 
Malaysia’s Securities Industry rules 
Section 122A, Section 122B, Section 122C, 
and Section 122D. Based on the calculation 
of the Beneish M-Score, it was found that 
there were 14 out of 17 sample companies 
classified as fraudulentfinancial reporting. 
In addition, findings were obtained namely 
Beneish Model variables which often 
appear in fraud modus (from highest to 
lowest) TATA, DSRI, LEVI & SGAI, GMI, 
as well as AQI, SGI, and DEPI.
3. METHOD
Sample
The method of sample selection in 
this study used a purposive sampling 
method with judgment sampling 
technique. This research used two 
different sample characteristics, namely 
manipulator companies and non-
manipulatorcompanies. The criteria used 
in sampling are as follows:
1. The manipulator company sample was 
a company that was sanctioned or fined 
for violating the Financial Services 
Authority Regulation (POJK) X.K.1; 
X.K.4; IX.E.1; IX.E.2; and VIII.G.7 
during 2012-2016 (financial and bank-
ing sector companies are excluded).
2.  A sample of non-manipulator companies 
was a company that does not have an in-
dication of fraud, and has a number of 
assets and or sales that are comparable 
or almost the same as a manipulator 
company in 2012-2016 in the same in-
dustrial sub-sector based on the 2-digit 
code structure in Jakarta Stock Indus-
trial Classification (JASICA).
DataAnalysisTechnique
The research test used descriptiveStatistics, 
Wilcoxon test, and Logsitic Regression 
Analysis, as follows:
 (Y) = β0 + β1  + β2  + β3  + β4  + β5  + β6 
+ β7  + β8  + εi
information :
Fraud  : Dummy (number 1 for fraud 
firms &number 0 fornon-fraud firms 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8  : Coefficien-
Table 1
Selectionof Research Samples
Information Total
Public companies are exposed to cases due to violationsPOJK no. IX.E.1 ; 
IX.E.2 ; X.K.1 ; X.K.4 ; and VIII.G.7
77
Delisting (16)
Finance Sectors (6)
Number of Manipulator Companies 55
Number of Non Manipulator Companies(control) 55
Sample Total 110
Year of Observation(2012 – 2016) 5 years
Number of observations 550
Source: Data was processed by the author (2018)
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tregression 
DSRI  : Day’s sales receivables index 
GMI : Gross profit margin 
AQI  : Asset quality index 
SGI  : Sales growth index 
DEPI  : Depreciation index 
SGAI : Sales and general adminisstration 
expenses index 
TATA  : Total accrual to total assets  
LEVI  : Leverage index 
εi  : Residual
4. RESEARCH RESULT AND 
DISCUSSION
Based on the calculation of the Beneish 
M-Score formula obtained results, as many 
as 28 of the 55 manipulator companies 
were classified correctly doing fraud or 
by 50.91%. Meanwhile, the remaining 27 
companies were declared Incorrect or not 
indicated to commit fraud. Then there 
were as many as 33 of the 55 companies 
for the non-manipulator category correctly 
Table2
Formula Of ModelBeneish M-Scoreand Bench Mark Score
Formula Bench Mark Explanation
FRAUD = -4.84 + 0.920 X DSRI + 0.528 X GMI + 0.404 X AQI + 0.892 X 
SGI + 0.115 X DEPI – 0 .172 X SGAI +  4.679 X TATA - 0.327 X LEVI
> -2,22 It shows Indications of financial fraud 
within companies
1.465
Asset overstate-
ment: inflating the 
value of receivables
1.193 Economic difficulty.
1.254
Improper capitaliza-
tion of expenses.
1.607
Revenue recogni-
tion: fictitious 
revenue.
1.077
Earning manipula-
tion: inflating the 
useful life of assets 
and increasing 
income
1.041 Earning manipula-tion.
1.111 Earning manipula-tion
0.031 Revenue recogni-tion 
Source : Beneish et.al (2012), Hasan et.al (2017), and Bell (2009)
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classified as stated as not indicated to 
commit fraud or by 60%, the rest of which 
were 22 companies declared Incorrect.
Table 4 provided relevant information 
regarding the classification of manipulator 
and non-manipulator companies which are 
stated Correct and Incorrect based on the 
industrial sector, companies with M-Score 
values greater than -2.22 will be declared 
fraud firms and vice versa when the value 
of M-Score was less than -2.22 will be 
classified as non-fraud firms. In addition, 
the table above also describes information 
about the distribution of research samples 
based on the industrial sector, namely 
in sector (1) Agriculture, there are 4 
companies, then (2) Mining as many as 14 
companies,(3) Basic & Chemicals Industry 
there are 22 companies,(4) Miscellaneous 
Industry 6 companies, (5)Consumer 
Goods Industry4 companies, (6) Property, 
Real Estate, and Building Construction, 
there are 14 companies,(7) Infrastructure, 
Utilities, & Transportation as many 
as 16 companies, (9 ) Trade, Services 
&Investment as well as30 companies.
In This study will present the order or 
ranking of each Beneish M-Score variable 
that was manipulated by manipulator 
and non-manipulator companies. This 
discussion refers to Hasan et al. (2017) 
and Kamal etal. (2016). This ranking was 
based on the quantity of the Beneish 
M-Score variable which has a value above 
the Bench Mark and was sorted from 
the largest to the smallest. By looking at 
Table 5, information about the number of 
companies, percentages, and the frequency 
of variable manipulation of Beneish 
M-Score are presented in the form of ranks.
Most manipulator companies manipulate 
M-Score variables, namely (1) SGAI 
variables manipulated by 54 companies 
(98.18%), (2) DEPI variables manipulated 
Table3
Calculation  Beneish M-Score Manipulatorand Non-Manipulator Companies
Manipulator Comapnies Non-Manipulator Comapnies
Correct (Fraud Firms) 28 50,91% Incorrect (Fraud Firms) 22 40%
Incorrect (Non-Fraud Firms) 27 49,09% Correct (Non-Fraud Firms) 33 60%
Source : Data was processed by the author (2018)
Table 4
Calculation Beneish M-Score based on Indutry Sectors
Industry Sectors
Correct (Fraud)
Manipulator Non-Manipulator Total Company
Incor-
rect 
(Non-
Fraud)
Correct 
(Non-
Fraud)
Incorrect 
(Fraud) Manipu-
lator
Non- Ma-
nipulator
1 Agriculture 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 Mining 5 2 3 4 7 7
3 Basic & Chemicals Indus-
try
3 8 6 5 11 11
4 Miscellaneous Industry 2 1 1 2 3 3
5 Consumer Goods Industry 2 0 2 0 2 2
6 Property, Real Estate, and 
Building Construction 4 3 3 4 7 7
7 Infrastructure, Utilities, & 
Transportation 3 5 5 3 8 8
9 Trade, Services, & Invest-
ment
8 7 12 3 15 15
Total 28 27 33 22 55 55
Source : Data was processed by the author(2018)
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by 49 companies (89.09%), (3) AQI 
variables and LEVI has been manipulated 
as many as 42 companies (76.36%), (4) 
GMI variables have been manipulated as 
many as 37 companies (67.27%), (5) TATA 
variables have been manipulated as many 
as 35 companies (63.63%), (6) as many as 
30 companies manipulate DSRI variables 
(54.54%), and (7) SGI variables have been 
manipulated by 24 companies. Whereas, 
on the other hand the non-manipulator 
companies encountered the following 
findings, namely, variables that often 
appear manipulated were (1) 53 companies 
(96.36%) having SGAI values  higher 
than Bench Marks, (2) DEPI variables 
manipulated by 49 companies (89.09%), (3) 
the AQI variable was manipulated by 39 
companies (70.90%), (4) the TATA variable 
was manipulated by 37 companies (67.27%), 
(5) the LEVI variable was manipulated by 
36 companies (65,45%), (6) GMI has been 
manipulated by 30 companies (54.54%), 
(7) DSRI has been manipulated by 21 
companies (38.18%), and (8) SGI has been 
manipulated by 10 companies (18.18%). So, 
generally for both manipulator and non-
manipulator companies, it can be said that 
the variables that are often manipulated are 
the SGAI, DEPI, and AQI variables, while 
the variables that are rarely manipulated 
are the DSRI and SGI variables.
Table 6 provided three important 
information, namely the frequency of 
each variable during 2012-2016, the 
total frequency of each variable, and the 
ranking of each variable based on the 
total frequency. The calculation results 
reveal information that was for the SGAI 
variable manipulator category ranked 1 
with 129 frequencies, rank 2 namely DEPI 
with 93 frequencies, AQI and LEVI rank 3 
with 71 frequencies, rank 4 namely GMI 
with 64 frequencies, TATA rank 5 with 62 
frequencies, rank 6 namely DSRI with 51 
frequencies, and rank 7 was SGI variable 
with 37 frequencies. Whereas for the 
category of non-manipulator companies 
the results are almost the same, where 
SGAI (Rank 1, 121 frequencies), DEPI 
(Rank 2, 91 frequencies), TATA (Rank 3, 81 
frequencies), AQI (Rank 4, 66 frequencies), 
LEVI (Rank 5, 63 frequencies), GMI 
(Rank 6, 46 frequencies), DSRI (Rank 
7, 26 frequencies), and SGI (Rank 8, 12 
frequencies). The results presented above 
provide almost the same evidence as that 
presented in table 5, which was based 
on frequency levels during 2012-2016, in 
general both for manipulator and non-
manipulator companies it can be said that 
variables with high frequency are SGAI, 
DEPI, and AQI, while low frequency 
variables are DSRI and SGI variables.
Table 5
Companies That HaveaBeneish M-Score Variables Value Abovethe Bench Mark 
Value
Beneish   
M-Score 
Variables
Companies with vari-
able values above Bench 
Mark
Percentage of Compa-
nies
Rank
Manipula-
tor
Non-Manip-
ulator
Manipu-
lator
Non-Manip-
ulator Manipulator
Non-Manip-
ulator
DSRI 30 21 54,54% 38,18% 6 7
GMI 37 30 67,27% 54,54% 4 6
AQI 42 39 76,36% 70,90% 3 3
SGI 24 10 43,63% 18,18% 7 8
DEPI 49 49 89,09% 89,09% 2 2
SGAI 54 53 98,18% 96,36% 1 1
LEVI 42 36 76,36% 65,45% 3 5
TATA 35 37 63,63% 67,27% 5 4
Source : Data was processed by the author(2018)
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Based on tables 7 and 8 explain the 
same thing about the frequency of each 
variable Beneish M-Score based on the 
industrial sector of the manipulator 
and non-manipulator companies. This 
research refers to the classification of the 
industrial sector based on JASICA (Jakarta 
Stock Industrial Classification) which was 
included in the factbook IDX during 2012-
2016. JASICA divides nine main industrial 
sectors, namely Agriculture; Mining; Basic 
& Chemicals Industry; Miscellaneous 
Industry; Consumer Goods Industry; 
Property, Real Estate, and Building 
Construction; Infrastructure, Utilities, 
& Transportation; Finance; and Trade, 
Services, & Investment, specifically for the 
industrial sector (8) Finance in this study 
was excluded.
By looking at tables 7 and 8 three 
important information are obtained, 
namely the frequency level of each 
Beneish M-Score variable based on each 
industry sector, the total frequency of 
each M-Score variable, and the ranking 
(ranking) of each M-Score variable based 
on number of frequencies. Table 7 shows 
the results for manipulator companies 
that the SGAI variable was ranked 1 
with 129 frequencies, then DEPI was 
ranked 2 with 93 frequencies, AQI and 
LEVI are ranked 3 with 71 frequencies, 
ranked 4 filled with GMI variables with 64 
frequencies, then ranked 5 namely TATA 
with 62 frequencies, rank 6 DSRI with 
a total of 51 frequencies, and rank 7 was 
SGI with 37 frequencies.Table 8 presents 
information about non-manipulator 
companies as follows, SGAI variable 
(Rank 1, 121 frequency), DEPI variable 
(Rank 2, 91 frequency), TATA variable 
(Rank 3, 81 frequency), AQI variable (Rank 
4, 66 frequency), LEVI variables (Rank 5, 
63 frequencies), variable GMI (Rank 6, 
46 frequencies), DSRI variables (Rank 7, 
26 frequencies), and SGI variables (Rank 
8, 12 frequencies). So, in tables 7 and 8 
provide information about the frequency 
level of the Beneish M-Score variable in 
each industry sector and generally give 
conclusions, both manipulator companies 
and non-manipulator companies can be 
said that variables with high frequency 
numbers are SGAI variables, DEPI, and 
AQI, while low frequency variables are 
DSRI and SGI variables.
Descriptive statistics
The variable Days Sales in Receivables 
Index (DSRI) in manipulator companies 
was known to have a minimum value 
of 0,000 owned by Bumi Resources 
Mineral Tbk, then for the maximum 
known value of 71.8742 obtained from 
KertasBasukiRachmat Indonesia Tbk, and 
the average value was for DSRI which was 
1.523331 and the standard deviation value 
was 4.5555348, while for non-manipulator 
companies the minimum value of DSRI 
of 0.0000 was owned by Central Omega 
Table 6
Variables Valuesthat Exceedthe Bench Mark Basedonthe Year Of Fraud
Vari-
ables
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Total Rank
M NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M NM
DSRI 10 5 10 6 9 8 11 3 11 4 51 26 6 7
GMI 11 7 14 7 11 15 15 7 13 10 64 46 4 6
AQI 11 8 14 16 17 15 15 15 14 12 71 66 3 4
SGI 7 4 3 2 9 3 8 1 10 2 37 12 7 8
DEPI 17 15 19 19 15 17 24 20 18 20 93 91 2 2
SGAI 25 23 32 32 24 24 27 21 21 21 129 121 1 1
LEVI 11 7 15 12 14 11 18 21 13 12 71 63 3 5
TATA 14 11 7 16 11 17 18 16 12 21 62 81 5 3
Source : Data was processed by the author (2018)
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Resources Tbk, the maximum known 
value of 79.0101 was obtained from the 
company Citra MargaNusaphalaTbk, and 
the average value was known as 1.517669 
while for the standard deviation value was 
5.1690591.
The Gross Margin Index (GMI) 
measured the variability of the company’s 
gross profit from year to year, the 
manipulator company describes the 
minimum value of -10.2968 obtained 
from SMR UtamaTbk, the maximum 
value of GMI was 46.9029 owned by Argo 
PantesTbk, and the average valuewas 
1.098385 and the standard deviation 
value was 3.2547690. Whereas for a non-
manipulator company the minimum value 
was known as -30.7835 obtained from 
Asia PasificInvestamaTbk, the maximum 
value of 54.2857 wasowned by Golden 
Eagle Energy Tbk, the average value was 
1.133917 and for the standard deviation 
Table 7
Manipulator Companieswith Variables Values Above Bench Mark Based on JASI-
CA Industrial Sector Codes (JAKARTA STOCK INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION)
Vari-
able
Agri-
culture
(1)
Min-
ing
(2)
Basic & 
Chemi-
cals 
Indus-
try (3)
Miscel-
laneous 
Industry 
(4)
Con-
sumer 
Goods 
Indus-
try (5)
Proper-
ty, Real 
Estate, 
and 
Build-
ing 
Con-
struc-
tion (6)
Infra-
struc-
ture, 
Utili-
ties, & 
Trans-
porta-
tion (7)
Trade, 
Services, 
& Invest-
ment (9)
Total Rank
DSRI 2 9 10 4 1 6 6 13 51 6
GMI 2 8 18 6 1 3 17 9 64 4
AQI 2 16 14 5 3 2 10 19 71 3
SGI 2 7 5 2 2 6 5 8 37 7
DEPI 6 12 25 6 5 10 11 18 93 2
SGAI 5 21 26 5 5 14 17 36 129 1
LEVI 4 10 12 4 2 11 7 21 71 3
TATA 1 8 10 3 3 13 3 21 62 5
Source : Data was processed by the author (2018)
Table 8
Non-Manipulator Companies With Variables Values Above Bench Mark Based On 
JASICA Industrial Sector Codes (JAKARTA STOCK INDUSTRIAL  
CLASSIFICATION)
Varia-
bel
Agri-
cul-
ture
(1)
Min-
ing
(2)
Basic & 
Chemi-
cals 
Industry 
(3)
Miscel-
laneous 
Indus-
try (4)
Con-
sumer 
Goods 
Industry 
(5)
Property, 
Real Es-
tate, and 
Building 
Construc-
tion (6)
Infra-
structure, 
Utilities, & 
Transpor-
tation (7)
Trade, 
Ser-
vices, & 
Invest-
ment (9)
To-
tal Rank
DSRI 2 9 1 0 2 4 6 2 26 7
GMI 6 11 6 2 1 3 10 7 46 6
AQI 0 11 15 5 2 6 14 13 66 4
SGI 1 4 0 1 0 2 1 3 12 8
DEPI 5 12 18 3 2 13 12 26 91 2
SGAI 4 13 24 8 4 15 17 36 121 1
LEVI 1 11 6 6 2 7 15 15 63 5
TATA 1 12 14 5 3 21 10 15 81 3
Source: Data was processed by the author (2018)
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value was equal to 4,2137648.
Asset Quality Index (AQI) aimed to 
test the quality of company assets in a 
given year, table 9 presents manipulator 
company information regarding the 
minimum value of -9.6494 owned by 
BumiTeknokulturaUnggulTbk, the 
maximum value was known to be 103.4172 
by Cakra Mineral Tbk, and average value 
was 2.474276 and the standard deviation 
value was 8.6944356. Whereas for a non-
manipulator company the minimum 
value of 0.0378 was owned by ICTSI Jasa 
Prima Tbk, the maximum value obtained 
from Steady Safe Tbkwas 18.6066 and the 
average value was known as 1.232307 
and the standard deviation value was 
1.2985511.
Sales Growth Index (SGI) measures the 
company’s sales growth from year to year, 
for manipulator companies, the following 
information was known as the minimum 
value of 0.0000 obtained from SkybeeTbk, 
then the maximum value was known 
to be 34.9789 owned by Cita Mineral 
InvestindoTbk and the average value the 
average was 1.563582 and the standard 
deviation value was 3.3733783. Whereas for 
a non-manipulator company a minimum 
value of 0.0000 owned by Central Omega 
Resources Tbk, the maximum value was 
obtained from Bukit Darmo Property Tbk 
with a value of 9.4326 and an average value 
of 1.089843 and a standard deviation value 
of 0.6217200.
The Depreciation Index (DEPI) for 
manipulator companies had a description 
of the following information with a 
minimum value of 0.0041 and a maximum 
value of 710.3199 each obtained from 
Bara Jaya International Tbk and an 
average value of 3.873057 and a standard 
deviation value of 42.8000485. Whereas 
for a non-manipulator company with a 
minimum value of 0.0779 owned by Bukit 
Darmo Property Tbk, the maximum value 
obtained from Steady Safe Tbkwas 17.0488 
and the average value was 1.201979 and the 
standard deviation value was 1.2255369.
Sales and General Adminwastrative 
Expenses Index (SGAI) presented 
descriptive information for manipulator 
companies, namely the minimum known 
value of 0.0000 owned by SkybeeTbk, 
the maximum value of 234.2819 was 
obtained from Toba Pulp Lestari Tbk and 
the average value was 2.606914 and the 
value standard deviation was known as 
16.0525332. Whereas for non-manipulator 
companies a minimum value of 0.0000 was 
obtained from Central Omega Resources 
Tbk, the maximum value of 38.5805 was 
owned by BerlianLaju Tanker Tbk and 
the average value was 1.320285 and the 
standard deviation value was 2.7922896.
Table9
Descriptive Statistics
VARIA-
BELS
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
M NM M NM M NM M NM M NM
DSRI 275 275 0,0000 0,0000 71,8742 79,0101 1,523331 1,517669 4,5555348 5,1690591
GMI 275 275 -10,2968 -30,7835 46,9029 54,2857 1,098385 1,133917 3,2547690 4,2137648
AQI 275 275 -9,6494 ,0378 103,4172 18,6066 2,474276 1,232307 8,6944356 1,2985511
SGI 275 275 0,0000 0,0000 34,9789 9,4326 1,563582 1,089843 3,3733783 ,6217200
DEPI 275 275 ,0041 ,0779 710,3199 17,0488 3,873057 1,201979 42,8000485 1,2255369
SGAI 275 275 0,0000 0,0000 234,2819 38,5805 2,606914 1,320285 16,0525332 2,7922896
LEVI 275 275 ,0015 ,1230 35,1312 8,6669 1,360594 1,075235 2,7908490 ,5572005
TATA 275 275 -1,4837 -1,7027 ,9829 2,6484 -,036506 -,011051 ,2002957 ,2527153
Valid N 
(lwastw-
wase)
275 275
Source : Output SPSS (2018)
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Leverage Index (LEVI) provides a 
descriptive description of manipulator 
companies, namely a minimum value of 
.0015 obtained from IndoritelMakmur 
International Tbk, with a maximum 
value of 35.1312 owned by Surya 
IntrindoMakmurTbk and an average 
value of 1.360594 and a standard deviation 
of 2.7908490.While for a non-manipulator 
company with a minimum value of 
0.1230 owned by BerlianLaju Tanker Tbk, 
the maximum value was obtained from 
Central Omega Resources Tbk with a 
value of 8.6669 and an average value of 
1.075235 and a standard deviation value of 
0.5572005.
Total Accrual to Total Assets (TATA) 
for manipulator companies had a minimum 
value and maximum values  of -1.4837 and 
0.9829, respectively, are obtained from 
SkybeeTbk, then for the average value of 
-0.036506 and the standard deviation value 
0.2002957.Whereas for non-manipulator 
companies the minimum value was -1.7027 
owned by Rimo International Lestari Tbk, 
the maximum value was 2.6484 owned by 
Steady Safe Tbk and the average value was 
-0.011051 and the standard deviation value 
was0.2527153. 
Uji Wilcoxon
Table 10 showed the value of Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) of 0.457 for total assets and 0,000 
for sales value, respectively. Thus, at a 
real level of 5%, it was concluded that the 
total asset value between a manipulator 
company and a non-manipulator company 
has a comparable value (0.457>0.05), then 
it cannot reject Ho, which means there 
was no significant difference in asset 
value manipulator companies and non-
manipulator companies. While the sales 
value between manipulator and non-
manipulator companies has a significant 
difference, because it has an Asymp value. 
Sig. (2-tailed) below 0.05 (0,000 <0.05), then 
H1 cannot be rejected. So, the manipulator 
and non-manipulator companies that were 
the samples,and this study had comparable 
total asset values, but have a significant 
difference in the value of sales between 
manipulator and non-manipulator 
companies.
Logistic Regression Analysis
Table 11 shows that the eight Beneish 
M-Score variables namely DSRI, GMI, 
AQI, SGI, DEPI, SGAI, LEVI, and TATA 
are not significant at 0.05 (p> 0.005), 
then the null hypothesis (H0) cannot be 
rejected. The Logsitic Regression above 
shows that the log of odds of companies 
that commit fraudulent financial reporting 
(FFR) positively cannot be predicted with 
Days Sales in Receivable Index (DSRI); 
Gross Margin Index (GMI); Asset Quality 
Index (AQI); Sales Growth Index (SGI); 
Depreciation Index (DEPI); Sales and 
General Adminwastrative Expenses Index 
(SGAI); Leverage Index (LEVI); and Total 
Accrual to Total Asset (TATA).
Discussion
a) Effect of DSRI on FFR
The disproportionate increase 
in receivables from sales can 
relatively indicate a surge in income. 
So that a large increase in days’ 
sales in receivables index has a 
relationship with the possibility 
of recording income and profits 
Table10
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Total Asset dan Sales)
Test Statwasticsa
 TOTAL ASSET SALES
Z -,744b -3,582b
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,457 ,000
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
b. Based on negative ranks.
Source: Output SPSS (2018)
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that are too high. The accounts 
receivable account is prone to 
be manipulated by management 
for certain purposes such as by 
carrying out recording actions on 
premature accounts receivable or 
not eliminating receivables that are 
completely uncollectible, in the hope 
of being able to report overstatement 
of asset values. The problem of 
receivable loss can be overcome 
by the same treatment as after-sale 
boarding, namely by forming a loss 
reserve account. Thus income can 
be presented in the statement of a 
number of receivables that can truly 
be realized (net realizable value). 
According to Suwardjono (2016; 381) 
the loss of the estimated receivables 
can be presented in the group of 
sales costs related to collection of 
receivables or it can be a direct 
deduction of income items (eg sales).
b) Effect of GMI on FFR
According to Suwardjono (2016: 
464), profit is an increase in assets in 
a period due to productive activities 
that can be shared or distributed to 
creditors, governments, shareholders 
(in the form of interest, taxes and 
dividends) without affecting the 
integrity of the original shareholder 
equity. When the GMI value is 
greater than 1, this indicates that the 
company’s gross profit deteriorates. 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) in Beneish 
(1999) state that deteriorating gross 
profit shows a negative signal about 
the company’s prospects. So that 
companies with bad prospects are 
likely to do earnings manipulation.
c) Effect of AQI on FFR
Increasing the risk of asset 
realization will show an increase in 
the company’s involvement in asset 
capitalization and cost delays. In 
particular, the AQI variable detects 
whether there is a goodwill that 
may be vulnerable to manipulation. 
According to Suwardjono (2016: 448), 
goodwill is a residual advantage 
inherent in the company as a whole, 
treating goodwill as a specific 
attribute is tantamount to making 
income imputations. On the other 
hand, it is also not feasible to spread 
the value of goodwill to all assets 
due to the difficulty of identifying or 
relating goodwill to certain assets.
d) Effect of SGI on FFR
Fridson (1993. pp. 7-8) states 
that companies often try to eliminate 
the impression that their company’s 
growth is slowing down, because 
this perception can cause losses. 
According to Suwardjono (2016: 363), 
revenue recognition is the official 
recording of the amount of the 
rupiah into the accounting system 
so that the amount is reflected in the 
Table 11
Logistic Regression Test Results
Variabel B Wald Sig
DSRI 633,966 ,136 ,712
GMI 321,110 ,120 ,729
AQI 292,581 ,133 ,715
DEPI 634,396 ,132 ,716
SGAI 76,187 ,126 ,722
LEVI -121,667 ,132 ,716
TATA -237,208 ,084 ,772
Constant 3169,576 ,134 ,714
Chi-Square (Hosmer and Lemeshow Test) ,000 1,000
-2 Likelihood (Block Number : 0) 751,363
-2 Likelihood (Block Number : 1) ,004
Cox & Snell R Square ,745
Nagelkerke R Square 1,000
Source : Output SPSS (2018)
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financial statement. There are times 
when the sale of goods accompanied 
by the right to return (right of 
return), the right to return does not 
preclude the recognition of income at 
the time of sale and the sale of cash 
deductions also in no way prevent 
the recognition of revenue at the time 
of sale.
e) Effect of DEPI on FFR
A DEPI that is greater than 
1 indicates that the rate at which 
assets are depreciated more slowly 
increases the likelihood that the 
company has changed the estimated 
useful life of the asset or adopted a 
new method that can increase profits. 
According to Suwardjono (2016: 
445), depreciation should not be 
postponed simply because “income 
cannot cover costs”, the reason is that 
the wear / damage process will not 
stop because physical assets are not 
used and technological developments 
also continue to run during the 
depressation period. With the 
principle of accruals, depreciation is 
not an assessment process and also is 
not a means to cover the replacement 
price of fixed assets from consumers 
but rather a step (procedure) in the 
process of appropriately comparing 
costs and revenues.
f) Effect of SGAI on FFR
This variable is derived 
from the results of research Lev 
and Thiangarajan (1993) which 
states that analysts will interpret 
a disproportionate increase in a 
sale, indicating a negative signal 
for the company’s prospects in the 
future. According to Suwardjono 
(2016: 412), the concept of effort and 
achievement states that cost is an 
effort in order to obtain achievement 
in the form of income, this means 
there is a causal relationship between 
costs and income. The criteria for 
recognizing costs are utilization and 
disappearance, costs are recognized 
when economic benefits have been 
consumed in the context of delivering 
goods or services to bring income or 
when future economic benefits have 
disappeared (Suwardjono, 2016: 450).
g) Effect of LEVI on FFR
The value of LEVI greater than 1 
indicates an increase in the company’s 
debt. This variable is included in 
identifying earnings manipulations 
caused by debt contract incentives. 
Obligations have three main 
characteristics, namely the sacrifice 
of future economic benefits, become 
a necessity nowadays, and arise due 
to transactions or past events. The 
obligation to be more assertive if 
supported by the obligation to pay 
cash, its identification is paid off, 
and legally forced. The occurrence of 
liabilities is generally accompanied 
by the acquisition of assets or the 
emergence of costs (Suwardjono, 
2016: 321).
h) Effect of TATA on FFR
Beneish uses total accruals of 
total assets as a proxy to measure how 
much cash is a basis for reporting 
company profits. To determine a 
decent profit, cash base income must 
be compared with the costs that 
have been spent on cash, in other 
words the basic cash income must be 
compared with the accrual basis cost 
(Suwardjono, 2016: 394). Profit is the 
element that is most the concern of 
users of financial statements because 
the profit figures are expected to 
be rich enough to represent the 
company’s overall performance 
Therefore, from the point of view of 
accounting engineering or fraudulent 
financial reporting, the concept of 
profit is developed to meet the goal 
of providing information about 
company performance broadly 
(Suwardjono, 2016: 509).
5. CONCLUSION
The Beneish M-Score model had a high 
probability of detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting. The results showed 
that there were 28 of the 55 manipulator 
companies correctly classified as fraud 
firms by 50.91%, while for the category of 
non-manipulator companies, there were 
as many as 60% or 33 of the 55 classified 
companies appropriately declared as non-
fraud firms. The results also identified 
three M-Score variables that were often 
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manipulated by manipulator and non-
manipulator companies, namely Sales and 
General and Adminwastrative Expenses 
Index (SGAI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), 
and Asset Quality Index (AQI), but 
twoother variables namely Days Sales 
in Receivables Index (DSRI) and Sales 
Growth Index (SGI) are considered 
unable to detect fraudulent financial 
reporting.Based on the results of the 
Logsitic regression test and the discussion 
described earlier, it shows that the eight 
Beneish M-Score model variables have 
no effect on the detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting. Thiswas because the 
calculation of the Beneish M-Score model 
has a high multicollinearity that causes 
the ratio t (Sig value, variable in the 
equation) to be statistically insignificant, 
but both the R2 and the goodness of fit size 
of a model have a high value. Days Sales 
in Receivables Index (DSRI) detects the 
possibility of companies conducting asset 
overstatement: through improper increase 
in the value of accounts receivable. Then, 
the Gross Margin Index (GMI) variable 
can describe the economic difficulties 
that the company was experiencing. The 
Asset Quality Index (AQI) detects there 
was goodwill or the company deliberately 
capitalizes assets improperly. The Sales 
Growth Index (SGI) detects intentions in 
recognizing fictitious sales revenue, the 
variable Depreciation Index (DEPI) detects 
the company’s intentions in delaying 
depreciation expenses in the hope that 
reported profits will be higher. The 
Sales and General and Adminwastrative 
Expenses Index (SGAI) describes the 
proportion of operating expenses against 
company sales, and the Leverage Index 
(LEVI) identifies earnings manipulation 
caused by debt contract incentives and 
the Total Accrual to Total Assets (TATA) 
variable measuring how much cash was 
a baswas company profit reporting. This 
research had limitations, therefore the 
researcher proposes several suggestions, 
namely: 1) Further research was needed on 
the effect of the Beneish M-Score model on 
other factors beyond fraudulent financial 
reporting such as market response or stock 
returns. 2) This study has limitations, for 
further research it can use methods other 
than Logsitic regression tests and use 
tools other than SPSS in testing Logistic 
regression.
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